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DRAWING THE LINE IN SURROGATE
PARENTHOOD ARRANGEMENTS:
HOW THE INTENDED PARENT DEFINITION
OF NEW YORK SENATE BILL 1429
DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION TO
NON-MARRIED PERSONS
K.R. KACZMARSKI
Preface: The current status of New York
Senate Bill 1429-A is uncertain. As of publica-
tion date, the bill had not yet been reintroduc-
ed into the 1989 legislative session. In 1988,
the bill became dormant in the Child Care Com-
mittee. Gregory Serio, Special Counsel to the
bill's author, Senator John Dunne, stated in a
phone conversation with this author on March
1, 1989, that the future of S1429-A is depen-
dent on the Legislature's reaction to the newly
introduced Governor's Program Bill, A3558,
which would prohibit surrogate parenthood
contracts. A "wait-and-see" attitude has thus
been adopted regarding the disposition of
S1429-A.
I. INTRODUCTION
Surrogate parenthood arrangements are receiving in-
creased attention as controversy about their use grows. The
recent Baby M case, in which the surrogate's refusal to ter-
minate her parental rights ignited a major custody con-
troversy with the intended parents, is one example of this.1
In a surrogate parenthood arrangement, a fertile woman
agrees, for a fee, to become a surrogate2, conceiving a child
by insemination', and carrying that child to term. At birth,
the child is given to its intended parent(s)4, and the sur-
rogate terminates her parental rights.5 If an intended parent
is not biologically related to the child, that person must
adopt the child to accomplish legal parenthood.
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Surrogate parenthood arrangements are becoming
more common. Estimates of the last decade place the
number of babies born to a surrogate at approximately
500.6 Legal and ethical concerns about the practice
abound. Parentage, legitimacy, adoption, and contract
issues are currently being debated in the legal arena.7 The
ethical issues are concerned with concepts of humanity and
personal autonomy.8 Legislative proposals addressing these
issues exist in twenty-six states9 and in Congress10 , but
only three states, Arkansas, Louisiana and Nevada, have
enacted such legislation. 1
The New York State Legislature is attempting to res-
pond to surrogate parenthood arrangements. In 1988, six
proposals were introduced. Senate bill 1429-A would
legalize payment for surrogate services, designating the
responsibilities of the parties involved. 2 This proposal was
also separately introduced in the Assembly (A4748).1
Assembly bill 9857 provides for certain requirements im-
posed upon all parties to surrogate arrangements.14 Senate
bill 6891 (A8852) would prohibit surrogate parenthood,
paid or voluntary.15 Assembly bill 9882 declares surrogate
parenting to be against public policy and voids any such
contracts.1 6 Assembly bill 10851 (S9134) also prohibits
surrogate parenting contracts. 7
The constitutionality of the definition of intended
parent in Senate bill 1429-A is the focus of this article. The
bill defines the intended parents as "an infertile woman and
her husband" 8 , thus limiting the use of surrogate ar-
rangements to heterosexual married persons. If 1429-A is
enacted, this limitation would deny equal protection to non-
married persons'9 and, thus, would be unconstitutional.20
Equal protection analysis is triggered when similarly
situated persons are treated differently by legislative
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tion of married and non-married persons in relation to sur-
rogate parenthood arrangements. Key to understanding the
situation of these persons is a recognition of the notions
of family inherent in 1429-A and that used by this author.
In Section III, the nature of the right involved and the
appropriate standard of review are defined. Here, the right
to procreate is established as fundamental. The standard
of review to be applied is one of strict scrutiny. Therefore,
the state's definition of intended parent in 1429-A must
be shown necessary to achieve a compelling government
interest.
Section IV analyzes the relationship of the intended
parent definition to the state's interests. Senate bill
1429-A's main purposes are to create a stable home for
the child of a surrogate arrangement, and to prevent abuse
of these arrangements. 22 However, no evidence supports
the state to establish that these interests are compelling.
Nor is there evidence to show that the intended parent
definition is necessary to achieve the purposes of the pro-
posed legislation. In the context of differing ideas of family
and relationships in our society, the state's intended parent
definition must be justified with more than unexamined ex-
pectations of social norms.
This article concludes that non-married persons are
unjustifiably excluded from Senate bill 1429-A's intended
parent definition. Because the state has not established that
its definition is necessary to achieve the bill's purposes and
because these purposes are not compelling, the fundamen-
tal right of non-married persons to procreate is unconstitu-
tionally limited. Thus, equal protection is denied by the
exclusion of non-married persons from 1429-A's intended
parent definition.
II. The Similar Situation of Married
and Non-Married Persons in Relation
to Surrogate Parenthood Arrangements
Whether non-married and married persons are seen
as similarly situated depends on the use of the term "fami-
ly". The state uses the term in Senate bill 1429-A to. mean
a unit consisting of two married heterosexual parents - a
mother and a father - and their children, or what is termed
the "nuclear" family.2 3 This definition is too limited in the
context of surrogate parenthood arrangements.
This author defines family as a cohabitative unit of two
or more persons, with a primary focus on the care of its
members. 24 With this latter definition in mind, non-married
and married persons are similarly situated with respect to
surrogate parenthood arrangements, because both groups
are similarly confronted with the types of problems which
motivate use of these arrangements, i.e. infertility and in-
ability or unwillingness to adopt.
Surrogate parenthood arrangements offer viable solu-
tions for persons who desire to create a family of their own,
but lack either the biological ability to do so or the ability
or willingness to adopt. Infertility among women and men
has increased dramatically in the past generation. It is
estimated that one out of every six women, and one of
every six men, suffers some type of fertility problem.
2 5
Adoption is not always readily chosen by the childless
because, although there are a number of adoptable children,
the type of child desired by some, i.e. white infants, is not
as numerous at present.26 As a reproductive alternative,
surrogate arrangements offer a prospective parent the abili-
ty to beget a child, in a social and/or genetic sense. This
is a major motive for utilizing these arrangements.
27
Parenting is not inherently limited to married persons.
Single parenthood is on the rise.28 The decreasing marriage
rate and the increasing divorce rate which began in the last
decade sustain this trend.29 Potential parents are not only
married persons. Non-married persons may procreate if
they have the biological ability, and in lieu of such, non-
married persons may adopt.30 Consequently, there is no
reason why surrogate arrangements should not be available
to non-married persons.
III. The Appropriate Standard of Review
for the Right Involved
A. Equal Protection Standards of Review
The standard of review to be applied to legislation in
an equal protection analysis depends on the nature of the
right involved. To be fundamental, a right must be either
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.3
Governments employ classifications to include those who
may exercise a right and to exclude others from that exer-
cise. If a fundamental right is at issue, the applicable stan-
dard is one of strict scrutiny. The inquiry made is whether
the legislation is necessitated by a compelling government
interest, sufficient to limit the exercise of the right by the
individual.
32
If something other than a fundamental right is involv-
ed, one of two standards might be applied. At the very
least, a rational basis test will be used to determine whether
the classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
government end.3 3 The second standard is the intermediate
test, used when greater protection is required than is af-
forded by a rational basis analysis. 4 This intermediate test
requires a fair and substantial relationship between the
classification and an important, legitimate, and articulated
government interest.3 ' For the classification to remain
sound, the state must show that the relationship between
the legislative classification and purpose is constitutional-
ly permissible.
B. Fundamental Right to Procreate
The' exercise of the right to procreate is limited by
Senate bill 1429-A. Because the right to procreate is fun-
damental, strict scrutiny requirements must be met by the
state. This section traces the development of this fun-
damental right.
The right to procreate arises out of the constitutional-
ly constructed right to privacy. 36 In a line of cases since
SPPING 1989 21
1927-37, the Supreme Court has attempted to define the
right of privacy in relation to procreative matters. These
cases address three particular areas - sterilization, con-
traception and abortion. 9
Beginning with Buck v. Bell,3 9 the Court addressed the
issue of a state's power to sterilize people afflicted with
hereditary imbecility or insanity, committed to its mental
institutional system. Although Buck is no longer deemed
authoritative, it nevertheless provides important guidance
regarding the standards to be met by the state in its at-
tempts to limit procreative ability. 40 The procedure was
upheld on the basis of the state's overwhelming interest
in societal welfare. 41 Of note in Buck is that the plaintiff,
Carrie Buck, was economically dependent on the state, and
had already given birth to a child, who would also be depen-
dent on the state. This case suggests that a state's power
to sterilize is not unlimited, and that some type of extraor-
dinary conditions must justify the state's exercise of the
power to sterilize.
Skinner v. Oklahoma42 supports the assertion that a
state's power to sterilize is limited. In Skinner, the Court
struck down a state statute permitting sterilization as a form
of punishment for certain criminal offenses. Procreation
was therein given status as a fundamental right.43 The
statute did not withstand the strict scrutiny analysis
because its classification, which included larcenists but not
embezzlers, was not justified by a compelling government
interest.44 The state's inability to demonstrate a connec-
tion between the designated offenses and sterilization
upholds the view that the state can not exercise its power
over its charges on the basis of unsubstantiated assertions.
Thus, in the context of sterilization, Skinner asserts the
existence of the fundamental right to retain procreative
potential.
The Supreme Court was confronted next with the con-
traception issue in Griswold v. Connecticut.45 Here, the
Court overturned on privacy grounds a statute prohibiting
contraceptive use by married persons. 46 The state's pro-
ferred justification that the statute would deter extra-marital
relations was deemed insufficient to compel the limitation
of the fundamental personal liberty interest at stake.47 The
ruling thus established that the right to use contraceptives
(and thus avoid procreation) was included within the fun-
damental right of marital privacy.
48
Following Griswold, questions arose whether the right
to avoid procreation extended beyond the marital domain.
The Court's subsequent decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird
49
clarified the confusion Griswold created regarding the scope
of the fundamental right to procreate. The Court stated
this right as that of "the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into mat-
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."50
In Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a state statute that
denied non-married persons access to contraceptives, on
equal protection grounds. The compelling interests sought
to be established by the state were the protection of public
morality and the protection of public health. The state
argued that one purpose of the statute was "to protect puri-
ty, to preserve chastity, to encourage continence and self-
restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to
engender in the State and nation a virile and virtuous race
of men and women.""1 Denied access to contraceptives
would, ostensibly, discourage sexual relations between non-
married persons, and, thus, accomplish the ends of the
statute. The Court discounted this public morality purpose
because contraceptives were available to married persons
regardless of their intended use, and, as such, could be used
for purposes contrary to the statute, i.e. extramarital sex.
The Court concluded that the "statute is... so riddled with
exceptions that deterrence of premarital sex cannot
reasonably be regarded as its aim .
"
52
The state's interest in protecting public health was, ac-
cording to the Court, an invalid purpose; if contraceptives
posed a health danger, then it was discriminatory to
deny non-married persons the medical supervision afford-
ed married persons in contraceptive use. Eisenstadt is thus
far the only Supreme Court decision to address the rela-
tionship between equal protection and the procreative rights
of non-married and married persons.
The Supreme Court next examined the contraception
issue in Carey v. Population Services International.53 In this
case, a statute prohibiting contraceptive sales to minors
was held unconstitutional because it was unjustified by a
compelling state interest.5 4 The state's assertion that its
public policy to prevent teenage extramarital sex justified
the statute was rejected by the court because this premise
was not demonstrated in fact.5 5 The decision is significant
because it established that mere articulation of a state's
public policy is insufficient to limit the exercise of a fun-
damental right. The state must show that the condition
sought to be corrected exists, before limiting a fundamen-
tal right.
5 6
The third area of procreative privacy, abortion, was
addressed by the Court in Roe v. Wade.57 Roe overturned
a statute that prohibited abortion in all but a few "medical-
ly necessary" 58 instances. This statute unconstitutionally
infringed on a woman's right to procreative privacy.59 The
right to terminate pregnancy was thus established. 0
Although states retained some power to regulate use of
abortion procedures, any regulation would have to be com-
pellingly justified before a woman's fundamental right to
abortion could be curtailed.
61
This line of cases establishes the fundamental nature
of the individual's right to decisional autonomy in pro-
creative matters. Only a compelling government interest
can transfer this decision making power from the individual
to the state. An important aspect of the contraception and
abortion decisions is the concept that an individual is em-
powered to utilize medical assistance or other alternative
means to effectuate her or his procreative rights. If a woman
wants to avoid pregnancy, she does not have to avoid sex;
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she has the right to use contraceptives to avoid that
pregnancy. If pregnant, a miscarriage is not the only way
to end the pregnancy; a woman has the right to obtain an
abortion. The use of alternatives, in the form of contracep-
tives and medically-assisted abortion, is permissible. The
right to avoid procreation is not limited to the individuars
biological ability to do so.
A second aspect of these cases is that an individual's
right to avoid procreation can not be thwarted by denial
of the means to achieve that right. The right to avoid pro-
creation is in some sense inextricably connected with ac-
cess to medical assistance or other alternatives. Subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court have given greater mean-
ing to this concept. Because the right to avoid procreation
inheres in the individual, statutes that have required the
consent of a husband to the wife's abortion 62, or the con-
sent of a minor's parents to her abortion 63 have been held
unconstitutional. Statutes requiring that abortions be per-
formed only in a hospital have also been overturned bas-
ed on the unconstitutional interference with the right to
avoid procreation. 6' An area that remains unprotected,
however, is denial of access because of indigency. In at least
one case to date, the Court has held that obstacles to the
exercise of procreative rights not created by the govern-
ment, are not necessarily unconstitutional.
65
If an individual has the right not to procreate, then it
follows that an individual has the freedom not to exercise
that right - in other words, the right to procreate. 66 This
right is, almost without exception, absolute for individuals
who have the biological and economic ability to bear and
beget children. Once public assistance, economic or other-
wise, is needed by the individual, the absolute nature of
the right is. diminished, and the state begins to regulate
the right. Although the initial decision of whether to bear
or beget a child is constitutionally protected, 67 it is pro-
blematic whether the protection extends to decisions about
the method of procreation. As John Robertson has pointed
out, "choices about who may conceive, bear, or rear a child
are distinct from choices about the conduct that occurs in
the process of conceiving, bearing, and rearing. In other
words, the freedom to procreate is distinct from freedom
in procreation."
68
The Supreme Court has yet to consider whether an
individual, married or non-married, has a right to utilize
reproductive alternatives, such as surrogate parenthood,
to achieve procreation. 69 The lower courts are, however,
moving toward a willingness to protect affirmative pro-
creative choice. Their decisions, as Andrea Stumpf has
noted, encourage "recognition of a fundamental interest in
procuring assistance to overcome a personal inability to
procreate .... (For) the right to procreate ... to be fully
protected... certain derivative rights (must be assured)."7"
The right of married persons to exercise affirmative
procreative choice is easier to assert given the decisions
that protect various rights within a marital setting.7 ' Ac-
cording to John Robertson, use of reproductive alternatives,
such as surrogate parenthood, by married persons would
be allowable as "an extension of the rights of familial
autonomy and natural conception that the courts have
already recognized." 2 This does not mean, however, that
non-married persons are automatically excluded from ex-
ercising the same procreative choice. Eisenstadt made clear
that procreative decisions inhere not in the marital or
familial relationship, but in the individual. The individual
right to use alternative means to achieve procreation can
be inferred from the Supreme Court decisions allowing the
use of alternative means to prevent procreation. 3 More im-
portantly, just as state denial of access to abortion and con-
traception frustrates the right to avoid procreation, state
denial of access to surrogate parenthood would render the
right to procreate meaningless for individuals who are
unable to do so with their own biological abilities, in the
same way that never affording the right in the first place
would do.14 A right which can not be exercised is not a
right. Therefore, the use of reproductive alternatives to ef-
fectuate procreation is an interest as fundamental in
character as the right to procreate.
IV. The State's Intended Parent Definition Is
Not Justified By Compelling State Interests.
Senate bill 1429-A would make the use of surrogate
parenthood by infertile married persons a fundamental
right, thus settling the question of the status of procreative
choice for that particular group. 5 However, the limitation
of eligibility to heterosexual, married persons subjects the
bill to constitutional scrutiny. To remain constitutional, the
bill must be justified by the state showing that limiting the
use of surrogate parenthood to these persons is necessary
to accomplish a compelling government interest.
The first major justification proferred by the state is
that its limitations will work toward the creation of a per-
manent home and settled rights of inheritance for the child
of a surrogate arrangement.76 The notion of the stable
home is generated by the ideology of the American nuclear
family fostered by the state. It is presumed that heterosex-
ual married persons provide stability, and, further, that such
stability is necessary to raise a child. According to Barbara
Kritchevsky, "[t]raditional American legal and social values
support this unit and urge its protection and encourage-
ment as the foundation of society."77
A second related justification is based on the state's
role as parens patriae and as the protector of morality. The
state would argue that it has an affirmative duty to pre-
vent abuse of surrogate parenthood, thus protecting the
morality of its citizens.78 Protection of morality translates
into public policy. The ideology of the nuclear family is in-
tegral to this public policy. The abuse of surrogate ar-
rangements would occur when persons not in a nuclear
family, i.e. non-married, non-heterosexual persons, utilize
these arrangements. To allow such use would weaken the
ideology of the nuclear family. Perceived threats to the
nuclear family are prohibited by the state based on public
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policy, 9 or, rather on the ideology of the nuclear family.
In the absence of evidence of the effects of surrogate paren-
thood, the limitation of surrrogate parenthood to nuclear
families is seen by the state as the only method of ensur-
ing a stable home for the child and preventing abuse of
the practice. 80 In other words, it is a way to protect the
nuclear family.
The state may rely on legal precedent for its view that
the nuclear family is the only appropriate context for sur-
rogate parenthood. Marriage is given protection as a fun-
damental right.8" The marital relationship is presently
afforded greater protections than similar non-marital rela-
tionships; acts which occur within a marital context are sub-
ject to less state interference on that basis.8 2 Same-sex
marriages are prohibited, thus perpetuating the view that
procreation is a proper function of a heterosexual nuclear
family. 83 Marriage is viewed as an appropriate comerstone
upon which to build a family.8 4 Ostensibly, the public act
of marriage demonstrates the necessary commitment on
the part of the family to create and maintain a family.8
A third justification for the state's intended parent
definition is that by allowing non-married persons to use
surrogate parenthood, complex issues of parental fitness
would need to be resolved. This, it is argued, would place
an administrative burden on an already overburdened
judicial and social services establishment. The use of the
marriage requirement is a method of determining the in-
tended parent's level of commitment. Presumably, the fact
that two persons have signified their commitment to each
other by marriage, and that they are willing to go to great
lengths to bring a child into their family, indicates a serious
level of commitment toward the perpetuation of the ideal
of the (nuclear) family. Conversely, persons who are not
married are presumably not as committed to that ideal.
8 6
There is growing evidence to rebut the premise that
a nuclear family will create a stable home. The nuclear unit
is losing its justification for existence as several factors
erode its societal base.87 One such factor is divorce. The
nuclear unit is being split by a 50% divorce rate, and the
corresponding rise of single-parent families and those of
remarried divorced parents, i.e. blended families. 88 Further-
more, the nuclear unit is not the dominant, timeless unit
that the state suggests it to be. The blended family struc-
ture and that of the single parent are equally pervasive in
society. 89 In addition, approximately 25-35% of children
in today's society are currently being raised by persons
other than their biological parents.9 0
To posit that one particular family structure creates
a better individual than any other ignores the countless fac-
tors which shape both the individual and the family struc-
ture.91 If the nuclear family were the best environment in
which to raise a child, one might expect that such in-
dividuals would not be plagued with life's troubles in the
same way as other persons. However, the physical, emo-
tional and psychological development.of a child is depen-
dent more on the character of the individual(s) who raises
her or him, than on the family unit in which she or he is
raised.
9 2
While legal precedent affords protection to certain deci-
sions made within a marital context, no one particular fami-
ly form has yet received judicial sanction to the exclusion
of all others. Of particular interest is Moore v. East
Cleveland.93 In Moore, the Supreme Court invalidated a
zoning ordinance which was structured according to a nar-
rowly defined family pattem.9 4 In New York State, judicial
recognition of family structures other than the nuclear one
has been accorded in cases regarding adult adoption,95
custody of children, 96 and leasehold situations.97
The state's concern for settled inheritance rights as a
justification for the nuclear family is also misplaced. The
marriage of intended parents does no more to settle the
child's inheritance rights than if the parents were not mar-
ried. Given the legal presumption regarding parentage, 98
the child's inheritance status does not become certain un-
til the intended parent achieves legal custody.99 The adop-
tion procedure must necessarily be completed by the
non-biological intended parent.100 Settled inheritance rights
are contingent on the resolution of legal parentage, which
is independent of the marital status of an intended
parent. 101
The interests posited by the state as justification for
its denial to non-married persons of access to surrogate
arrangements fail because these interests have not been
given a basis in fact by the state. If the state presented em-
pirical evidence to support its view that the nuclear family
is the only appropriate context for surrogate arrangements,
then the state could better demonstrate a compelling in-
terest which would justify its classifications. However, to
base limitations on vague notions of how things should be
or to prevent imagined abuses is, at the least, an abuse
of classificatory powers, and, at best, a lazy manner in
which to legislate. The state attempts to limit the use of
surrogate parenthood to a segment of society which it
favors. If it is the role of legislators to represent their con-
stituents, then to only represent those persons who cur-
rently practice or believe in the ideology of the nuclear family
is to ignore the others who are not encompassed by this
narrow category.
In formulating an appropriate legislative response to
the surrogate parenthood question, the state would benefit
from the wisdom of Oliver Wendell Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule
of law than that it was so laid down in the time
of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past." 3
It must be remembered that other family structures exist
in addition to that of the nuclear family. Furthermore, the
nuclear family is no longer as prevalent as it may once have
been, and will probably never be so again.
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As Senate bill 1429-A presently exists, it would not
survive a constitutional challenge based on equal protec-
tion grounds. To survive such a challenge, the proposed
legislation must include non-married persons in its intend-
ed parent definition. This would recognize those persons
who remain single by choice or are legally unable to marry,
but nevertheless desire to become parents.
The state's nuclear family preference is being challeng-
ed by current decisions regarding custody.0 2 Persons who
are not part of a nuclear family are increasingly being
granted custody. These decisions utilize a "child's best in-
terests" standard, of which parental fitness is a key com-
ponent." 3 Factors which, in the past, have been held as
per se indicators of parental unfitness are now being
reevaluated. These include the sexual preference of the
parent and her/his chosen lifestyle.' 0 4 A 1982 review of
23 factors used by appellate courts in making custody deci-
sions revealed a marked preference for stability of environ-
ment, that is, the type of environment provided by the
parent - physical, emotional and psychological.1
0 5
The validity of the state's purpose to prevent abuse
of surrogate parenthood must be questioned. The state
perceives that abuse of the practice will lead to the
disintegration of the nuclear family. To allow non-married
persons to use surrogate parenthood would, in the state's
view, work toward this disintegration. This concern about
surrogate parenthood is, however, contradicted by the legal
availability of adoption to non-married persons. "' Since
the welfare of a child is a prime concern in adoption, it
might be expected that the state's preference for the nuclear
family would mandate that a potential adoptive parent be
married. Yet no such requirement exists. The changes in
the legal status of adoption and custody arrangements in-
dicate that assumptions which formerly made it difficult
for non-married persons to be parents are being reevaluated
in their favor, and are therefore more likely to benefit non-
married persons who seek to use surrogate arrangements.
A significant factor to examine is the non-married per-
son's intent to create a family. That a person is willing to
utilize surrogate parenthood - to expend the considerable
amount of time, money and energy necessary for its suc-
cess - is an unambiguous indicator of parental intent.1
0 7
This intent should be ascertainable in bill 1429-A's pro-
posed judicial screening which would precede participation
in surrogate arrangements. 0 8
While the limitation to married persons may facilitate
administrative efficiency, this does not constitute a state
interest sufficient to compel the limitation of a fundamen-
tal right. As stated by the Supreme Court, "although ef-
ficacious administration of governmental programs is not
without some importance, 'the Constitution recognizes
higher values than speed and efficiency'. .. . [W]hen we
enter the realm of 'strict judicial scrutiny', there can be no
doubt that 'administrative convenience! is not a shibboleth,
the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality."'0 9
V. CONCLUSION
The state interests outlined above are not sufficiently
compelling to necessitate the state's restrictive intended
parent definition in Senate bill 1429-A. Thus, the re-
quirements of strict scrutiny would not be met if constitu-
tionally challenged. Although the intended parent definition
may work toward the creation of a stable home and pre-
vent abuse of surrogate arrangements, these purposes do
not constitute compelling government interests absent sup-
porting evidence. There is no evidence presented by the
state to suggest that the nuclear family is the only ap-
propriate structure in which to use surrogate arrangements.
Nor is there evidence which supports the assertion that ex-
panding the intended parent definition will subject the prac-
tice to abuse. More than unexamined expectations of social
norms are needed to justify limiting the exercise of a fun-
damental right. As stated in Carey, "[w]hen a State ...
burdens the exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt
to justify that burden as a rational means for the ac-
complishment of some state policy requires more than the
unsupported assertion ... that the burden is connected to
such a policy."" 0 It must be noted that the structure of the
proposed bill undermines its stated legislative intent.' It
is posited that it is the individual's right to utilize surrogate
arrangements, but then a classification is created prohibiting
such use by a large number of individuals - all those who
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